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Introduction 
This work considers the issue of European security and defence cooperation. Talk 
abounds about Europe as a ‘civilian power’ or as a ‘normative superpower’, which 
exercises ‘soft power’ in international relations. The touted effectiveness of these 
notions is predicated upon the ideal of a universal humanity. Human beings are 
understood as progressive social animals, infinitely malleable and ‘unconstrained’, in 
both our moral sentiment and rational potential.i From this initial perception of human 
nature, it is considered that through the destruction of local tradition, and the 
assiduous application of reason to social interaction, humanity will come to 
understand the rationality of a particular conception of the good - styled as a universal 
- and will thereby come to live in concord within a universal and homogeneous end 
state of history.ii  
 
Even as Europe engages in international efforts, the focus of which is the ascendancy 
of this particular conception of humanity, I would posit that the foreign policy 
practitioners of Europe have never forgotten the centrality of power to international 
relations. Indeed, as this essay will argue, despite the inclusion of the welfare of 
humanity as the promulgated objective of European security and defence policy, the 
states of Europe are still mindful of the classic notion presented by the Prussian 
military philosopher Karl von Clausewitz, in his military treatise On War, that:  
 
If bloody slaughter is a horrible spectacle, then it should only be a 
reason for treating war with more respect, but not for making the sword 
we bear blunter and blunter by degrees from feelings for humanity, 
until once again someone steps in with a sword that is sharp and hews 
away the arms from our body.iii     
 
There is also the idea that Europe is an economic superpower and that its combined 
market area, balance of trade, and the strong value of the Euro, give it influence and 
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power in the world. This position is undoubtedly correct in some measure, as 
economic power is a source of latent power and does produce influence; however, this 
conception represents only a single aspect of aggregate power and influence properly 
constituted.iv Moreover, as Oswald Spangler argued in The Decline of the West: 
 
He who is out for purely economic advantage—as the Carthaginians 
were in Roman times … is correspondingly incapable of purely 
political thinking. In the decisions of high politics he is ever deceived 
and made a tool of … moral sentiment.v   
 
This work, then, takes a different view from either the normative or economic idea of 
Europe. My argument is grounded within the theoretical foundations of political 
realism, and thus gives simultaneous attention to the effects of the material structure 
of international relations and state pursuit of power. Thus, I follow Hans 
Morgenthau’s prescription that: 
 
international politics, like all politics, is a struggle for power. Whatever 
the ultimate aims of international politics, power is always the 
immediate aim. Statesmen and people may ultimately seek freedom, 
security, prosperity, or power itself. …But whenever they strive to 
realize their goal by means of international politics, they do so by 
striving for power.vi  
 
The states of Europe have clear objectives and goals internationally, some of which 
are strict material interests and some of which are highly informed by European 
values. Irrespective of the nature of Europe’s security objectives the means to obtain 
these specified ends remain the same. The states of Europe need to cooperate in the 
area of security and defence to maximize their relative power in order to ensure the 
satisfaction of their desired goals.   
 
This work is presented in six sections. The first discusses how cooperation in high 
politics is often presented as a challenge to the neorealist or systemic realist paradigm. 
The second section provides a discussion of the material and geographic origins of the 
need for cooperation to satisfy the foreign policy objectives of the state of Europe. In 
the third section I consider the descent of the world into the steady logic of the bipolar 
Cold War era, illustrating how this system constrained European actions, thereby 
limiting security and defence cooperation. The fourth section considers the re-
emergence of a will to power among the nation states of Europe, but one that is 
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situated within a broader cooperative framework of European action. The fifth section 
considers how this re-conceptualization of security has led to greater cooperative 
European action. Greater cooperation, in this case, is obtained as a result of two 
interrelated pressures. The sixth section considers the split in foreign policies that 
occurred as a result of the 2003 Iraq War. I then conclude with an analysis of a new 
European threat assessments, which indicates that by 2025 Europe will be faced with 
an increasing insecure position within the international system. 
 
This work, therefore, establishes the likelihood of both persistent and greater 
European cooperation in security and defence. It responds to a simple research 
question: What are the prospects for future European cooperation in the areas of 
security and defence? In response, I argue that the major powers of the European 
Union will invariably pursue greater cooperation in security and defence in order to 
increase their material power relative to the other major powers in the system. The 
causes of this pursuit will vary, of course. This paper’s purpose, however, is to 
consider the logic of international action as it influences states. Thus, in order for 
Europe to act internationally, and to secure its promulgated security objectives, the 
states of Europe must pursue greater cooperation and increase their relative material 
power.       
       
The Challenge of European Cooperation and the Pursuit of Power 
European cooperation is often presented as a challenge to realist thinking. Central to 
this argument is the idea that the states of Europe appear to be pursuing absolute gains 
in preference to short-term relative gains.vii The assumption that states pursue relative 
gains is a derived conclusion from the broader neorealist argument that the 
international system is one of self-help.viii  Neorealist theory presents an argument 
about the overarching material structure of international relations, which effectively 
places constraints upon the range of possible state action. It does not, therefore, 
dictate in a deterministic manner the ways in which a state will necessarily respond to 
these constraints. The self-help quality of the international system is predicted upon 
the causal effect of anarchy, where states, acting as unitary actors on the basis of 
exogenously given corporate interests, become functionally undifferentiated units.ix 
As Kenneth Waltz argues, ‘the theory makes assumptions about the interests and 
motives of states, rather than explaining them. What it does explain are the constraints 
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that confine all states. The clear perception of constraints provides many clues to the 
expected reactions of states’.x The constraints placed upon states limit, but do not 
exclude, the possibility of cooperation, particularly in those areas of state policy that 
are considered ‘high politics’, that is, the areas of defence and security.  
 
As Adrian Hyde-Price has argued, neorealist theory can ‘shed considerable light on 
the systemic pressures that “shape and shove EU member states’” international 
behaviour’.xi Persistent cooperation is explicable, then, given the arguments about 
international structure and the assumptions of state agency allowed for in neorealist 
theory. Thus, neorealism provides a set of theoretical boundaries for state action, 
while states themselves retain considerable room for political manoeuvring. As Waltz 
recognized: 
 
with skill and determination structural constraints can sometimes by 
countered. Virtuosos transcend the limits of their instruments and 
break the constraints of systems that bind lesser performers.xii  
 
Indeed, the perception of this crucial political dynamic is central to neorealist 
arguments about European cooperation, which argue from a structural perspective that 
the European countries will increase their security cooperation.xiii What these works 
leave underspecified, however, is the theory of foreign policy that underlies a state’s 
political action in its response to structural pressures. Thus, even if one concedes that 
the structure of the international system can pressure states towards cooperation in 
security, a careful reader is left questioning the direction and meaning of European 
security and defence cooperation. 
 
What is implicit in the structural argument, however, is the reliance on some form of 
political realism within their considerations. I will argue that political realism, as a 
theory of foreign policy, provides the most coherent guide for the states of Europe. I 
explicitly maintain, then, ‘that international politics can be understood only if the 
effects of structure are added to the unit-level explanations of traditional realism’.xiv I 
give due deference, therefore, to changes to the international structure, but only in the 
manner in which they influence a state’s perceptions of security and the international 
system. My primary focus, however, remains centred upon the European states’ 
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pursuit of power, through greater cooperation, as a means to satisfy their international 
objectives.  
 
The Distribution of Power and the States of Europe: Why Cooperation is 
Necessary  
It is important to stress that my work considers cooperation in defence and security, 
and not integration. The difference is that integration would result in the 
harmonization of policy and outcomes, as decisions, once reached, would become 
binding upon the member states. The intergovernmental structure of European 
defence and security cooperation - promulgated in the ‘Second Pillar’ of the Treaty of 
Maastricht in 1992 - precludes integration in the short to medium term and, therefore, 
the harmonization of security policy. In contrast, as Seth Jones has observed, ‘security 
cooperation’ occurs when states adjust their foreign policy and defence behaviour to 
the actual or anticipated preferences of others. States cooperate to realize gains that 
are unachievable through individual action; policymaking is achieved multilaterally 
rather than unilaterally.xv 
 
In the present context of European security and defence cooperation, power remains 
the means to fulfill the international desires of political actors. Increased cooperation 
in security and defence, therefore, is undertaken in order to maximize the relative 
power of Europe. This cooperation, in turn, enables the European states ‘to realize 
gains that are [held to be] unachievable through individual action’.xvi  
 
An important place to begin such a discussion of cooperative behaviour is in the early 
stages of the Cold War, with an analytical focus on France, Britain and Germany. 
From each state’s national character and history, these nations perceived themselves 
as being Great Powers. Each state was decimated by the World Wars and in 
consequence, each moved from Great Power status into a secondary rank. Germany 
was partitioned between Soviet and American spheres of political influence and 
initially forbidden from pursuing military rearmament, thus reducing its international 
power.  
 
For the two Allied nations of Britain and France the decline was slower but 
nevertheless perceptible. In 1956 during the Suez Crisis - an event precipitated by 
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Britain and France - the actions taken by the United States clearly demonstrated the 
change in the distribution of power within the international system. As Henry 
Kissinger notes, the Suez Crisis ‘was the first and only time that the United States was 
to vote with the Soviet Union against its closest allies’.xvii British and French troops 
were forced to withdraw from the Sinai as a result of international pressure. It needs 
to be borne in mind, however, that the presence of international pressure it not the 
feature of this situation which signals the decline of British and French relative power. 
All states in the international system are subject to exogenous pressures, which 
attempt to push or pull their foreign policies in any given direction. It was not the 
presence of international pressure, then, but the British and the French lack of 
sufficient power and authority to overcome this pressure, that illustrates their relative 
decline.  
 
This lack of power did not go unnoticed, however. Shortly following the events in the 
Suez, German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer reportedly stated to the French Foreign 
Minister Christian Pineau: 
 
France and England will never be powers comparable to the United 
States and the Soviet Union. Nor Germany, either. There remains to 
them only one way of playing a decisive role in the world; that is to 
unite to make Europe. England is not ripe for it but the affair of Suez 
will help to prepare her spirit for it. We have not time to waste: Europe 
will be your revenge.xviii  
 
The central issue in security cooperation, that ‘states cooperate to realize gains that 
are unachievable through individual action’,xix is clearly present in the early 
beginnings of European cooperation. I do not mean for this to be taken as a 
teleological or deterministic argument, as the course of history is never set. I merely 
want to indicate that the initial sentiment and politics surrounding European 
cooperation involved the issue of relative power and that the former Great Powers 
were keenly attenuate to these concerns. Moreover, it stands to reason that such 
considerations have likely persisted throughout the successive stages of European 
integration.  
 
A crucial point is that the states of Europe recognized that the changing distribution of 
power within the international system affected their ability to pursue their 
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international objectives. The former Great Powers knew, then, that without security 
cooperation, their power, relative to the great continental powers of the United States 
and the Soviet Union, would never be comparable.xx Indeed, as Morgenthau notes in 
reference to national power, ‘it is not be accident that the two most powerful nations 
today, the United States and the Soviet Union, come closest to being self-sufficient [a 
result of their continental size] in the raw materials necessary for modern industrial 
production and control at least the access to the sources of those raw material that they 
do not themselves produce’.xxi To obtain their desired ends within the international 
context, the states of Europe needed to cooperate in order to increase the aggregate 
power relative to both the United States and the Soviet Union.  
 
At this point a clearer discussion of the concept of power needs to be given. At its 
most fundamental, as German Sociologist Max Weber argues, ‘by power is meant that 
opportunity existing within a social relationship which permits one to carry out one’s 
own will even against resistance and regardless of the basis on which this opportunity 
rests’.xxii This paper is expressing the notion, then, that power is expressed solely in 
the exercise of one’s will over another social party. The multiple forms by which this 
power is manifest must therefore be recognized. Hard power can be considered the 
product of military arms, which force others to do your will, or, derivatively, power 
can be exercised through the threat of violent action and civilian suffering.xxiii Indeed, 
it is this second variation of power that is often overlooked, or at the very least, 
neglected for its more unpalatable qualities. As Thomas Schelling has observed, ‘it is 
extraordinary how many treatises on war and strategy have declined to recognize that 
the power to hurt has been, throughout history, a fundamental character of military 
force and fundamental to the diplomacy based on it’.xxiv To these primary aspects of 
state power, needs to be added the concept of ‘soft power’, as articulated by Joseph 
Nye. In this conceptualization of power, influence is obtained by having others come 
to want what you want; a country thus obtains its desired ends in a fashion that does 
not seem to explicitly rest on the ability to invariably force compliance.xxv Soft power 
was not intended as an unlimited substitute for hard power, instead it was meant to 
provide an easier and more humane way of obtaining ones goals. Invariably, however, 
soft power rests on an implicit foundation of hard power; even as the influence that is 
obtained from the threat of violence is always underwritten by the actual material 
capability to do harm.xxvi Underwriting even the gentlest form of power, then, is the 
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concern over greater material ability. As Samuel Huntington argues, ‘[w]hat … makes 
culture and ideology attractive?’xxvii That is, what makes the instruments of soft power 
appealing?  
 
They become attractive when they are seen as rooted in material 
success and influence. Soft power is power only when it rests on a 
foundation of hard power. Increases in hard economic and military 
power produce enhanced self-confidence, arrogance, and belief in the 
superiority of one’s own culture or soft power compared to those of 
other peoples and greatly increases its attractiveness to other 
peoples.xxviii  
 
This extended discussion of power will serve as a basis for the subsequent discussion 
of European security and defence integration. Indeed, the relevancy of cooperation in 
the areas of defence and security gain increased salience, as they provide the 
foundation for the other forms of power and influence. Thus, European influence and 
security requires effective military power, as British Prime Minister Tony Blair 
illustrated in March of 1999: ‘we Europeans need to restructure our defence 
capabilities so that we can project force, can deploy troops, ships and planes beyond 
our home bases and sustain them there, equipped to deal with whatever level of 
conflict they may face’.xxix Any consideration of European security and defence 
cooperation, then, is at some level always discussing both the ability and the 
likelihood that Europe will engage in the aggregation of military power for the 
broader purpose of influence. 
 
The Attempts at Cooperation and the Logic of the Cold War   
During the more or less static period of the Cold War, the United States responded to 
the structural logic of the bipolar distribution of power with the perception that there 
was a ‘self-dependency of parties, [a] clarity of dangers, [and a] certainty about who 
has to face them’.xxx America’s great material power produced expansive global 
interests, which included protecting and restoring the material power of Europe to 
contain the threat of the Soviet Union.xxxi European states were able to rely, and 
arguably ‘free ride’, upon an explicit American security guarantee.xxxii The European 
states took advantage of this reprieve from the condition of anarchy to pursue 
economic and political integration. As Robert Gilpin argues: ‘states attempt to create 
an international political environment and rules of the system that will be conducive 
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to the fulfillment of their political, economic, and ideological interests’.xxxiii The states 
of Europe undertook the processes of integration to shape Europe into a political 
environment that fulfilled the lead states economic, political and ideological 
objectives.  
 
In the area of security and defence cooperation, numerous failed attempts were made 
during the Cold War.xxxiv These attempts can be seen as efforts to establish a 
European sphere of security and military influence through intergovernmental 
cooperation. As Seth Jones illustrates, however, the structure of the international 
system and the continued presence of a security threat from the Soviet Union were not 
conducive to persistent cooperation in defence and security. According to the 
structural logic, limited cooperation resulted during the Cold War for two reasons. 
First, the benefits of free riding on the American security guarantee were too great.  
Second, cooperation in defence and security would have weakened the transatlantic 
alliance resulting in American Isolationism and a retraction of the American security 
guarantee provided through the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). As then-
British Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden noted in 1952: ‘[European integration] is 
something which we know, in our bones, we cannot do …We know that if we were to 
attempt it, we should relax the springs of our action in the Western Democratic cause 
and in the Atlantic Association which is the expression of that cause’.xxxv These two 
reasons limited any serious attempts at security and defence cooperation during the 
Cold War.    
 
In the period of years between 1989-1991, however, as the Soviet Union began to 
disintegrate, there emerged a new distribution of power within the international 
system.xxxvi During this time, arguments were presented that stressed the re-emergence 
of power politics in Europe and a return of traditional nationalist sentiment.xxxvii These 
arguments treated changes to the distribution of power within the international system 
deterministically, effectively overlooking the fact that changes in structure can be 
interpreted and influenced by state foreign policy. The counter-argument has also 
been made, that rather than limiting cooperation and pressuring towards the 
breakdown of Europe, the new distribution of power actually promotes European 
cooperation.xxxviii As noted earlier, however, neorealist theory requires, indeed it 
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necessitates, the presence of state agency. States are always expected to decide the 
ways in which they will respond to systemic changes.  
 
These works that argue from the structural level of generality are valuable. The focus 
of this work, however, on the necessary will to power of the nation-states of Europe, 
presents a unit-level and complementary augmentation of the changing logic of 
international structure. In what follows I will consider how Europe has redefined its 
conception of security, in response to the changing international system, to maximize 
its power and how this redefinition of security has also necessitated a critical 
rethinking of the age old concept of victory.  
 
The End of the Cold War and the Reemergence of a European Security 
Shortly before the end of the Cold War, in 1987, only 49% of Europeans indicated 
that they thought Europe would possess a common military force by the year 
2000.xxxix After the collapse of the Soviet Union, in 1991, the level of respondents 
rose to 57%; this change in public perception clearly indicates a corollary change in 
perceptions towards the idea of cooperative defence.xl There are two factors that 
contributed to this change in public opinion. First, was the collapse of the Soviet 
Union—that is, a change in the distribution of power in the international system. The 
political elite recognized the changing systemic pressures and the possibility of 
greater European action. In February of 1990, for example, during an interview on 
German reunification, then-French President Mitterrand stated that:  
 
the main thing, for me, is for Europe to take up its true place in the 
world again after the self-destruction of two world wars. In short, I 
expect Europeans to keep in mind, as I do, a paraphrase of that well-
known expression, “Let Europe take care of itself”.xli  
 
The international context was ripe for cooperation in security and defence. 
 
The second change was in the emergent possibility of greater European action. It was 
in many respects, then, the 1991 Gulf War that persuaded both the European public 
and political elites that the idea of greater aggregate power was desirable, given their 
perceptions of the new international security environment. The intervention in the 
Persian Gulf was an almost unprecedented case of the United Nations acting against a 
classical form of interstate aggression. On 2 August 1990, Iraqi military forces 
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invaded the contiguous country of Kuwait. By November the UN Security Council 
had passed ten resolutions.xlii These Security Council actions had set out a legal 
framework in preparation for UN military action. Military action was subsequently 
carried out under UN authorization, by a US led coalition.  
 
These changes entailed two clear implications for European security cooperation. 
First, they raised the possibility of the exercise of power within a legitimate 
framework of action. Indeed, this point remains central to the European Union’s 
(EU’s) security strategy. The second point is that the overwhelming quality of this 
Allied military victory gave rise to greater calls for European capabilities that could  
 
perform similarly. As Manigart and Marlier illustrate: ‘as a consequence of the Gulf 
[W]ar, 74% of European citizens believed the E.C. should have a common foreign 
policy, 64% that it should speed up its political, economic and monetary integration, 
while 62% would like to see the E.C. have a common European military intervention 
force’.xliii 
 
The increased relative power of Europe remains central. Regardless of the stated 
causes for the increases in public support, whether it followed from a desire to support 
the international liberal order; to have Europe act legitimately within a UN mandate; 
or as a personal act of lustration in seeing European forces supporting a particular 
conception of the good; the only functional means by which a cooperative and 
autonomous Europe could come to act internationally was the result of the same 
phenomenon: the acquisition and use of material power.  
 
On 19 June 1992, the states of the Western European Union (WEU) outlined the goals 
of European security and defence cooperation. The objectives of the WEU security 
cooperation, labeled the ‘Petersburg Tasks,’ would cover humanitarian and rescue 
tasks, peacekeeping, crisis management, as well as peacemaking. xliv Security was 
being redefined in a specific way, adding a degree of humanity to the concerns of high 
politics; despite this re-conceptualization of the meaning of security, the means to 
obtain these ends remained unchanged. The full execution of these tasks required the 
acquisition of material capabilities, which underscores the WEU’s need to aggregate 
power. 
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The new security objectives correspond to the societal imperative of the post Cold 
War publics, where value is placed on multilateral action, humanitarian causes, and 
peaceful coexistence. A consequence of a clearer correlation between security and the 
societal imperative, the overall salience of European security issues was increasing. 
Despite the increased salience of security concerns, the defence budgets of European 
nations were decreasing, thereby limiting the ability of each individual state to 
contribute to the European defence and the satisfaction of the newly promulgated 
security objectives.xlv Given, then, the emerging global vision of European security 
interests and the decreased capability of the individual states - particularly, Britain, 
France, and Germany - to satisfy these ends, cooperation in the area of security and 
defence seems both materially and politically prudent.  
 
In 1832, Clausewitz expressed the dictum ‘that war is not merely an act of policy but 
a true political instrument, a continuation of political intercourse, carried on with 
other means’.xlvi Europe’s military doctrine, indeed, the delineation of a theatre of 
operation for Europe’s military capabilities, must follow from a political conception. 
A conception that will be predicated upon a specifically European strategic culture, 
but will be driven by the interests of the major states: Britain, France, and Germany. 
Through the institutionalization of security cooperation in the Treaty of Maastricht, 
Europe has begun to fashion a particular strategic culture.xlvii I would maintain that 
this is not necessarily the same as the social constructivist idea of mutually 
constitutive and intersubjectively developed identities and interests.xlviii I would note, 
however, that there is not necessarily a contradiction between social constructivism 
and political realism, as both theories are historically contingent and rooted in an 
actor’s perception of events.xlix  I think, then, that the emergent European strategic 
culture strongly parallels Thucydides’ notion that an ‘identity of interest both among 
cities and among individuals is the surest of all guarantees’.l Britain, France, and 
Germany will still seek to control the policy output of the European security and 
defence institutions, in a continued effort to serve their respective national interests. 
The European identity of interest, when and where it does exist, will be derived from 
the fact that no European state can consistently influence international events on its 
own. The incentive for either increased conflict or cooperation, therefore, is 
necessitated by each state’s relative position within the international system. If no 
identity of interests exists, then conflict is increasingly likely, as states will pursuit 
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strategic and military gains intended to enhance their relative position. However, that 
the nations of Europe desire to obtain similar security ends, as promulgated in the 
Petersburg tasks, illustrates that there is currently a strong identity of national interest.  
 
The Denial of the Will and External Disregard for European Power 
Greater cooperation seems increasingly necessary each time that the states of Europe 
have failed to influence the course of history. That is, every time their will has been 
denied, their power disregarded, and their prestige tarnished, Europe has responded by 
increasing the qualitative degree of their security cooperation. Europe attempted to act 
internationally during the situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1992-1995. After a 
daunting and failed effort to reconcile the tensions in the Balkan region, the EU forces 
were ready and willing to turn control of the mission over to the United States and 
NATO forces.li The conclusion of this crisis, in the American negotiated Dayton 
Peace Accord, was an erosion of EU prestige, which created a lasting memory that is 
still recalled. As Christopher Patten, the EU Commissioner for External Relations 
remarked to the European Parliament on 17 January 2001, ‘too often in the past, take 
the Balkans for example, we have just not been able to respond with efficiency or 
timeliness that developments in the real world demand’.lii  
 
The power of the EU, relative to even warring factions within the Balkan region, had 
been shown to be insufficient to allow Europe to assert its will and obtain its desired 
security objectives. One of the greatest impetus for aggregating power, then, results 
from the denial of a nation’s will. Europe had failed to assert its will, and this 
demonstrated its lack of power and authority. Indeed, as an exogenous security and 
defence area of grave concern, the Balkan region has routinely furthered European 
security and defence cooperation. As Jolyon Howorth has argued, for example: 
 
The urgency of responding to the external ‘events’ has forced policy 
actors to co-ordinate their approaches. Whereas in the summer of 1991 
Berlin, Paris and London adopted very different approaches to the 
crisis in Yugoslavia, ten years later it is difficult to detect even a 
nuance of difference between these three capitals on Balkan policy.liii         
          
A few years after the Bosnia Crisis, then, at Saint-Malo in December of 1998, the 
British and the French delegations came together on the issue of European defence 
capabilities, even though the British government ha
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initiative only a year earlier at the EU Council summit in Amsterdam, in 1997.liv The 
Saint-Malo Declaration states that ‘the Union must have the capacity for autonomous 
action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them and a 
readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crisis’.lv The British and French 
calls for autonomous action and capabilities are particularly telling in regard to 
Europe’s acquisition of power to pursue its desired ends. As the Saint-Malo 
declaration marked ‘the first overt use of that word [autonomous] in any European 
security blueprint’.lvi Perceptions of inadequate defence resources and power were 
contributory affects, which were influencing European defence cooperation.  
 
In 1999, with American and NATO intervention in Kosovo, European perceptions of 
limited power worsened and the European inability to assert its will internationally 
was once again flaunted. The Presidency Conclusions of the Cologne European 
Council demonstrate this point. The Council members declared in 1999, that:  
 
We, the members of the European Council, are resolved that the 
European Union shall play its full role on the international stage. To 
that end, we intend to give the European Union the necessary means 
and capabilities to assume its responsibilities regarding a common 
European policy on security and defence.lvii  
 
The Presidency Conclusions stated further that in order to satisfy the ‘Petersburg 
tasks’, ‘the Union must have the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by 
credible military forces, the means to decide to use them, and a readiness to do so, in 
order to respond to international crises without prejudice to actions by NATO’.lviii 
Europe recognized again that in order to secure its desired ends in the international 
context, power was necessary and it had to be exercisable external to the NATO 
framework, which remained largely dominated by the United States. If Europe was to 
be a global actor, power commensurate to that position was necessary. 
 
Certainly, some steps had previously been taken to ensure greater coordination in 
defence and security policy. Article 26 of the Amsterdam Treaty, for example, 
established a High Representative for European Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) 
‘to improve the coordination and centralization of foreign policymaking’.lix The 
centralized coordination of European security policy was thus given a figure head. 
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The High Representative would be able to contribute to the discourse surrounding 
European security and defence issues through a policy planning group, as well as an 
early warning conflict unit that would assess threats to European, as well as 
international, peace and security.lx  
 
Also, in December of 1999, the European Union laid out the Helsinki ‘head line’ 
goals, which called for the creation of a rapid reaction force of 50,000 – 60,000 
personnel by 2003. Europe’s inability to assert its will independently of NATO and 
American influence was quickly becoming politically unacceptable. As Francois 
Heisbourg has illustrated the ‘constructive ambiguity’ of European integration had 
reached its limit in the area of security and defence.lxi And as I argued previously, for 
defence and security operations to be effective, clear political direction is necessary. 
Indeed, in the area of joint intergovernmental European action this notion becomes 
increasingly important, because the satisfaction of the political directives contributes 
to Europe’s ability to claim victory in security and defence operations. As Robert 
Mandel recently illustrated in 2007, the very definition of victory in the contemporary 
security environment has undergone a substantive shift.lxii Now states must account 
for both the relatively simple obtainment of military victory, as well as a more 
dynamic form of strategic victory, a point that corresponds to Europe’s re-
conceptualizing of security along more humanitarian lines in the Petersburg tasks.lxiii 
The salience of strategic victory is not new, of course. As the Prussian General 
Helmut von Moltke once decried in 1887: 
 
The days of cabinet wars are past; now we have only the people’s war 
… There is not one [… power] that can be so completely overcome in 
one or even in two campaigns that it will be forced to conclude an 
onerous peace; not one that will be unable to rise again, after a year, to 
renew the struggle.lxiv  
 
To maintain the strategic gains that are obtained through military victory requires 
longer term strategic considerations. Indeed, given the inherently subjective nature of 
any definition of victory, properly conceptualizing the issue in defence and security 
operations becomes particularly salient.lxv For the European Union, then, 
conceptualizing positive outcomes to military operations is especially important, as 
‘victory has the capacity to “influence the destiny of nations, shaping alliance 
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behaviour, perceptions of credibility and resolve, post-conflict expectations, and 
notions of revenge”’.lxvi  
 
To properly accomplish this re-conceptualization required specific political direction, 
rather than vague policy declarations. Moreover, material power and prestige need to 
be considered in tandem, as mutually constitutive elements of Europe’s position 
within the international system. The next logical step would be that Europe required a 
defence agency, to bring together the politics and the material resources which are 
necessary for a clear exertion of will internationally. Indeed, on 12 July 2004, the 
European Council did establish the European Defence Agency to coordinate 
resources, to develop Europeans capabilities, promote European research and 
development, and assess international peace and security issues.lxvii  
 
At every instance, then, when European power proved to be inadequate to accomplish 
Europe’s international objectives, greater cooperation in security and defence was 
seen a necessity. In accordance with certain social expectations, then, Europe has 
responded to this necessity in a pristinely human fashion, by attempting to overcome 
it. As Hannah Arendt argues in The Human Condition: ‘that same necessity that, from 
the standpoint of the public realm, shows only its negative aspect as a deprivation of 
freedom possesses a driving force whose urgency is unmatched by the so called 
higher desires and aspirations of man’.lxviii The specified higher ends of European 
security and defence policy are always to be subordinated in times of necessity to 
pursue of power. And as Michel Foucault argues, in the context of modern warfare: 
‘Wars are no longer waged in the name of the sovereign who must be defended; they 
are waged on behalf of the existence of everyone; entire populations are mobilized for 
the purpose of slaughter in the name of life necessity’.lxix Indeed, material power 
represents the necessity of international life.    
 
The Morass of the Iraq War and the Gradual Re-emergence of European 
Defence  
In 2002-2003, when Great Britain followed the United States and participated in the 
invasion of Iraq, the functional persistence European security and defence cooperation 
was put into question.lxx Indeed, the discordant interests between Great Britain and the 
other Continental powers gave rise to some speculative discussion about a defence 
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arrangement that would include Germany, France, Belgium and Luxemburg, but 
would exclude Britain. During a summit on 29 April 2003 the leaders of these four 
‘core’ countries came together to propose a security arrangement that would establish 
a European Policy Planning Staff, a move that lessened Europe’s reliance on NATO’s 
organizational structure and thus placed tremendous strain on the Transatlantic 
relationship.lxxi  
 
This move was a response to both public and elite political perceptions about the Iraq 
War, but it was more than simply a defence initiative. As Charles Grant argued: ‘the 
French and German Governments had for years toyed with the idea of establishing 
some sort of core Europe, which would provide leadership to an enlarged European 
Union’.lxxii 
 
The discussion, then, of what came to be known as the ‘Tervuren Initiative’, was 
shrouded in opposing interests, with Britain attempting to increase its power through 
its influence in Washington, while Germany and France attempted to form a core 
group to control the security and defence outputs of ESDP. Such tensions could seem 
to entail the gradual, yet inevitable, re-emergence of salient nation-states within 
Europe. I would argue, however, that this will not be the case.  
 
The divergence of interests was the result of a specific event in world politics, and 
because we are discussing cooperation and not integration, we should in fact expect 
that at times when state interests diverge, ESDP’s effectiveness will be limited. 
Indeed, as Anand Menon argues: 
 
the conflict has also had several salutary consequences for European 
Defence policy aspirations. … [T]he impact of the crisis has been to 
make explicit the tensions within the design of EU security policies 
that hitherto had been implicit.lxxiii  
 
The tensions, having been illustrated, are now the subject of debate and political 
renegotiation along the lines of a European political consensus. Indeed, new EU 
projects to enhance civil-military arrangement, and the Capabilities Development Plan 
agreed to on 14 December 2006, both point to a continued negotiation and 
cooperation between the major powers of the European Union.lxxiv As the 18 June 
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2007 Presidency Report on ESDP indicates, the EU’s security and defence operations 
are far-ranging with EU mission in Somalia, Darfur, and the Congo, as well as police 
training missions in the Palestinian Territories and Afghanistan.lxxv Despite the 
setbacks that have resulted from the divergence of state interests, European security 
and defence cooperation continues, and increased efforts at coordinated through the 
European Defence Agency will continue to increase the salience and power of a 
‘United Europe’.  
 
Indeed, Europe has increasingly become the policy focus of its member states. As 
then-German Chancellor Gerhard Schroder stated in 2005: 
 
As part of the European Union Germany today feels that it shares 
responsibility for international stability and order … NATO’s presence 
in Afghanistan had highlighted how helpful its military can be even in 
distant crises. However, it is no longer the primary venue where 
transatlantic partners discuss and coordinate strategies.lxxvi  
     
 
Conclusion: The Persistence of European Cooperation towards the Aggregation 
of Power  
In response to the challenge that European security cooperation is more of a passing 
fad than a true project of emergent statehood, tensions, such as those emerging during 
the Iraq War, must be considered relative to the overall need and incentive for a 
European defence and security project. If any European state could consistently act 
internationally, without heavy prejudice to NATO or the other EU members, then the 
likelihood of further European cooperation in security and defence would be limited.  
 
However, no single European state has the resources to consistently accomplish this 
task. The strongest state, Germany, could not even attempt such an action, as any 
withdraw from the EU project would invariably produce balancing behaviour in the 
other European Great Powers. The need to be secure and the security threats that are 
facing Europe will not diminish because of lack of political will and military 
capabilities, and so cooperation in security and defence is increasingly dictated by 
international realities.     
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Certainly, divergent interests will retard the progress of ESDP. As long as the 
distribution of power within the European system remains as it is, however, the major 
European states will continue to pursue ever greater European security and defence 
cooperation to obtain their international objectives through the collective use of 
power.  
 
Truly, Europe is not secure enough to be able to avoid international action. As An 
Initial Long-term Vision for European Defence Capability and Capacity Needs 
indicates, Europe faces numerous security threats: A decline in relative economic 
capabilities, an aging population and low fertility rates of around 1.5%, as well as the 
raising cost of public finance that take resources away from defence spending. In 
addition, the EU suffers from a huge energy dependency, where ‘by 2025, Europe will 
be externally dependent for 90% of its oil and 80% of its gas. …in other ways, 
European security interests may be directly or indirectly challenged by tensions 
arising not only in the near neighbourhood but also further a field’.lxxvii  
 
Europe is, then, increasingly responsive to a set of global interests. To meet the 
increased security and defence needs, the states of Europe will invariably have to act 
in concert, through persistent and institutionalized cooperation. The alternative—that 
is, the return of a hegemonic and revisionist Germany is implausible. Indeed, Europe 
is truly more powerful as a global actor than any single, or group of, European states 
acting together on the basis of some short term alliance. As the Europe Security 
Strategy (2003), A Secure Europe in a Better World, posits, ‘the increasing 
convergence of European interests and the strengthening of mutual solidarity of the 
EU makes us a more credible and effective actor. Europe should be ready to share in 
the responsibility for global security and in building a better world’.lxxviii To engage in 
the world is to assert its authority; to maintain and increase its prestige, and to 
accommodate its definition of security and victory in military operations. To obtain all 
of these objectives requires that Europe increases its relative material power. Thus, 
the objective of political realism is satisfied and can be seen as a guide for the actions 
of the states of Europe.  
 
To act in international politics is to assert power over others whose interests differ 
from your own. Power is a measure of one’s ability to have others respond positively 
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to your will, even in the presence of forces to the contrary. Europe cannot maintain a 
global presence without an increase in its material power, relative to the other major 
states in the system. Cooperation in the area of defence and security is necessitated, 
therefore, by the logic of the international structure, but it is also drawn by the 
inexorable facts of social existence in international politics.  
 
Notes 
                                                 
i
 Sowell, Thomas, A Conflict of Visions: Ideological Origins of Political Struggles, New York: William 
Morrow, 1987, pp. 18-39, particularly pp. 23-27. 
ii
 For an older description of the teleological end that is associated with liberalism see, for example: 
Fukuyama, Francis, The End of History and the Last Man, Toronto: Free Press, 2006 
iii
 von Clausewitz, Karl, cited in, Waltz, Kenneth, Man the State and War, New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1954, p. 221. 
iv
 For the sources of national power see: Morgenthau, Hans, Politics Among Nations 7th ed., Toronto: 
McGraw-Hill, 2006, pp. 122-162. 
v
 Spangler, Oswald, The Decline of the West, New York: Vintage Books, 1962, p. 402.  
vi
 Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations 7th ed,, p. 29.  
vii
 Powell, Robert, “Absolute and Relative Gains in International Relations theory” in Neorealism and 
Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate Baldwin, David, ed., New York: Columbia University Press, 
1993, pp. 209-233. 
viii
 Waltz, Kenneth Theory of International Politics, New York: McGraw-Hill, 1979, p. 91. 
ix
 Ibid., pp. 88-101.  
x
 Ibid., p. 122. Emphasis added.  
xi
 Hyde-Price, Adrian, “‘Normative’ power Europe: a realist critique,” Journal of European Public 
Policy, 13:2, March 2006, p. 219. 
xii
 Waltz, Kenneth, “A Response to My Critics” in Neorealism and its Critics Robert O. Keohane ed., 
New York: Columbia University Press, 1986, p. 344. 
xiii
 Hyde-Price, “‘Normative’ power Europe: a realist critique,”, pp. 217-234; Jones, Seth, The Rise of 
European Security Cooperation, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007 
xiv
 Waltz, Kenneth, “War in Neorealist Theory,” in The Origin and Prevention of Major Wars 9th ed. 
Robert I. Rotberg and Theodore K. Rabb eds., New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005, p. 41. 
xv
 Jones, The Rise of European Security Cooperation, p. 8 
xvi
 Ibid.,  
xvii
 Kissinger, Henry, Diplomacy, New York: Simon & Schuster, 1994, p. 542. 
xviii
 German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer, cited in, Kissinger, Diplomacy, p. 547 
xix
 Jones, The Rise of European Security Cooperation, p. 8  
xx
 Kissinger, Henry, Does America Need a Foreign Policy: Towards a Diplomacy for the 21st Century 
New York: Simon & Schuster, 2001, p. 22.  
xxi
 Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations 7th ed, pp. 126-127. 
xxii
 Weber, Max, Basic Concepts in Sociology, H.P. Secher trans., New York: Citadel Press, 1964, p. 
117. 
xxiii
 Schelling, Thomas C., Arms and Influence, London: Yale University Press, 1966 
xxiv
 Ibid., p. 33. 
xxv
 Nye Jr., Joseph S., “The Changing Nature of World Power,” Political Science Quarterly, 105: 2, 
Summer 1990, pp. 177-192.   
xxvi
 Schelling, Arms and Influence  
xxvii
 Huntington, Samuel P., The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order, Toronto: 
Simon & Schuster, 2003, p. 92.  
xxviii
 Ibid., p. 92. 
xxix
 Blair, Tony, “NATO, Europe, Our Future Security” Speech given at the NATO’s 50th Anniversary 
Conference. Available online at: http://www.number-10.gov.uk/output/Page1286.asp. 
xxx
 Waltz, “War in Neorealist Theory,” p. 48. 
Europe’s Aggregation of Power – Eric Jardine 
 
 37 
                                                                                                                                            
xxxi
 For a full discussion of the manner in which a state’s power affect its perceptions of insecurity and 
its conception of national interest see, for example, Jervis, Robert, “The Compulsive Empire” Foreign 
Policy 137, July/August, 2003, pp. 83-87; Kagan, Robert, “Power and Weakness: Why the United 
States and Europe see the World Differently,” Policy Review 113, June/July 2002, pp. 3-28. For a full 
discussion of Robert Kagan argument see, Kagan, Robert, Of Paradise and Power, New York: Vintage 
Books, 2004 
xxxii
 Joffe, Joseph “Europe’s American Pacifier,” Foreign Policy 54, Spring 1984, pp. 64-82. 
xxxiii
 Gilpin, Robert, War & Change in World Politics , New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981): 
24. 
xxxiv
 Jones, The Rise of European Security Cooperation, 57-96. 
xxxv
 British Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden, cited in, Jones The Rise of European Security 
Cooperation, 69.  
xxxvi
 Waltz, Kenneth, “The Emerging Structure of International Politics” International Security 18:2, 
Autumn 1993, pp. 44-79.  
xxxvii
 Mearsheimer, John, “Back To the Future: Instability after the Cold War” International Security 
15:1, Summer, 1990, pp. 5-56.  
xxxviii
 Hyde-Price, “‘Normative’ power Europe: a realist critique,” pp. 217-234; Jones, The Rise of 
European Security Cooperation 
xxxix
 Manigart, Philippe and Marlier, Eric, “European Public Opinion on the Future of Its Security” 
Armed Forces & Society 19:3, Spring 1993, p. 342 
xl
 Ibid., p. 342.  
xli
 French President François Mitterrand, cited in, Jones, The Rise of European Security Cooperation, p. 
89 
xlii
 Moore, Jr. John Allphin and Pubantz, Jerry, The New United Nations: International Organization in 
the Twenty-First Century, New Jersey: Pearson Education, Inc., 2006, p. 183. 
xliii
 Manigart and Marlier, “European Public Opinion on the Future of Its Security”, p. 346. 
xliv
 Center for Defense Information, The European Union’s “Headline Goals” – Current Status. 
Available online, accessed on March 8, 2008, http://www.cdi.org/mrp/eu.cfm 
xlv
 Alexander, Michael and Garden, Timothy, “The Arithmetic of Defence Policy” International Affairs 
77:3, 2001, pp. 509-529. 
xlvi
 von Clausewitz, Karl, On War, Toronto: Oxford University Press, 2007, p. 28. 
xlvii
 Cornish, Paul and Edwards, Geoffrey, “Beyond the EU/NATO dichotomy: the beginnings of a 
European strategic culture,” International Affairs 77: 3, 2001, pp. 587-603.  
xlviii
 Wendt, Alexander, “Anarchy is what States Make of it: The Social Construction of Power Politics” 
International Organization, 46:2, Spring 1992, pp. 391-425. 
xlix
 Barkin, Samuel J., “Realist Constructivism” International Studies Review, December 2003, pp. 325-
342. 
l
 Thucydides, History of The Peloponnesian War. Rex Warner trans., Toronto: Penguin Books, 1972, p. 
107. 
li
 Shearer, Andrew. “Britain, France and the Saint-Malo declaration: Tactical rapprochement or 
strategic entente?” Cambridge Review of International Affairs 13:2 (2000): 288. 
lii
 Chris Patten, “Rapid Reaction Force” remarks in the European Parliament (January 17, 2001). 
Accessed online on March 4, 2008, and available at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/news/patten/rrf_17_01_01.htm 
liii
 Howorth, Jolyon, “European Defence and the Changing Politics of the European Union: Hanging 
Together or Hanging Separately?” Journal of Common Market Strategies 39:4 (November 2001): 787. 
liv
 Shearer, “Britain, France and the Saint-Malo declaration: Tactical rapprochement or strategic 
entente?”, 283-298. 
lv
 Declaration on European Defence, cited in, Shearer, “Britain, France and the Saint-Malo declaration: 
Tactical rapprochement or strategic entente?” 285. 
lvi
 Howorth, Jolyon, “Britain, France and the European Defence Initiative” Survival 42:2 (Summer 
2000): 43. 
lvii
 Presidency Conclusion, Cologne European Council, Annex III (3-4 June, 1999): 30. Accessed online 
on March 10, 2008, available online at: 
http://ue.eu.int/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/kolnen.htm 
lviii
 Ibid., 30. 
lix
 Jones, The Rise of European Security Cooperation, 84. 
lx
 Ibid.,  
Europe’s Aggregation of Power – Eric Jardine 
 
 38 
                                                                                                                                            
lxi
 Hiesbourg, Francois, “European Strategic Ambitions: The Limits of Ambiguity” Survival 42:2 
(Summer 2000): 5-15. 
lxii
 Mandel, Robert, “Reassessing Victory in Warfare” Armed Forces & Society 33:4 (2007): 461-495. 
lxiii
 Ibid.,  
lxiv
 von Moltke, Helmut, cited in, Charles Townshend, “Introduction: The Shape of Modern War,” in 
The Oxford History of Modern War, Charles Townshend ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 
2005): 10.  
lxv
 Johnson, Dominic and Tierney, Dominic, “Essence of Victory” Security Studies 13:2 (2003): 350-
381. 
lxvi
 Mandel, “Reassessing Victory in Warfare”, 461. 
lxvii
 European Defence Agency, Backgrounder, Accessed online on February 12, 2008, available at: 
http://www.eda.europa.eu/genericitem.aspx?area=Background&id=122  
lxviii
 Arendt, Hannah, The Human Condition, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1958): 70 
lxix
 Foucault, Michel, cited in, Campbell, David, Writing Security (Minneapolis: University of 
Minneapolis Press, 1998): 201. 
lxx
 Menon, Anand, “From Crisis to Catharsis: ESDP after Iraq” International Affairs 80:4 (2004): 631-
648; Charles Grant, “Reviving European Defence Cooperation” NATO Review (Winter 2003): 1-3. 
lxxi
 Grant, Charles, “Reviving European Defence Cooperation” NATO Review (Winter 2003): 1-3. 
lxxii
 Ibid., 2. 
lxxiii
 Menon, “From Crisis to Catharsis: ESDP after Iraq”, 640. 
lxxiv
 European Defence Agency, Press Release, EU Government Launch New Plan to Build Defence 
Capabilities for Future ESDP Operations, (Brussels, 14 December, 2006) available online at: 
http://www.eda.europa.eu/genericitem.aspx?area=News&id=56 
lxxv
 The Council of the European Union, Presidency Report on ESDP, (Brussels, 18 June 2007): 1-38. 
lxxvi
 Gerhard Schroder, cited in, Jones, The Rise of European Security, 55.  
lxxvii
 European Defence Agency, An Initial Long-term Vision for European Defence Capability and 
Capacity Needs, (Brussels, 3 October 2006): 7. 
lxxviii
 European Security Strategy, A Secure Europe in a Better World, (Brussels, 12 December 2003):1. 
